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any reference to the recent criticisms of Mrs. Webb (Miss Beatrice Potter).

One other point. While it is largely true, as Mr. Gilman says on p. 347, that in general "socialism lays little stress upon morals," and that "the emphasis of its advocates is on the material side of life"; while it is perfectly right to stigmatize this as a blunder, and to regard as an "absurdity" the new doctrine "that the want of money is the root of all evil," it is yet most misleading to quote against socialists the statement (from Mr. W. D. Morrison's "Crime and its Causes") that "a mere increase of material prosperity generates as many evils as it destroys." No socialist advocates a *mere* increase of material prosperity: some would even be willing to dispense with a considerable amount of material prosperity.

These passages, and a few others, seem to me to be serious blemishes in a good book. On the other hand, it would be much easier to quote passages with which one can entirely agree, and which are in the highest degree instructive and stimulating. On the whole, the book is one which every student of social questions ought to read. It is always clear and interesting, often vigorous, and nearly always judicious.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER.

NOTES ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. By J. A. Stewart, M.A., Student and Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford. In Two Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892. Pp. ix, 539; 475.

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. Translated with an Analysis and Critical Notes. By J. E. C. Welldon, M.A. Head Master of Harrow School. London and New York: Macmillan, 1892. Pp. lxvii, 352.

Such space as can be given here to a notice of the first of the two works named above is quite inadequate to do it justice. Mr. Stewart has brought to his task, besides a trained judgment, an extensive knowledge of Aristotle's writings as a whole and of the literature relative to them, which can be appreciated best by those who know the difficulty of learning even a small portion of them. His work is executed on a different plan from Sir A. Grant's edition, in which the bulk of the commentary is thrown into the form of introductions,—a preferable plan, it would seem, for obtaining a

clear synopsis of the whole. The notes are of a complete and elaborate character, consisting in some cases of long and able disquisitions designed to interpret Aristotle's philosophy. The student will find here, even when he may not always agree with Mr. Stewart's judgment, ample means for forming a judgment of his own. Younger students will doubtless need the help of a teacher in selecting the more important notes. In particular, some of the longer notes in Book i. may with advantage be left to a second reading. Two valuable features are the following: the notes on each chapter are preceded by a full and careful statement of the argument, and, secondly, references to other works of Aristotle or to commentators are quoted in full. Mr. Stewart is sanguine enough to think that young students will read these quotations, but at any rate they would not look out the references for themselves, and to the older reader, who is also human, such full quotations are of the greatest value.

The success of a collection of notes like this cannot be judged except after continued trial in the work of teaching. Only a few brief remarks are possible here, and none at all on Mr. Stewart's treatment of textual difficulties, such, for instance, as the vexed questions of the text in the intermediate Books v.-vii., of doubtful authorship. Mr. Stewart seems to me happiest when he is explaining Aristotle's philosophical language in the *Ethics* by reference to other parts of his writings; so, for instance, the learned and interesting note on Nature (Book iii. ch. iii.), the careful explanation of the psychology of the will by help of the *De Anima*, or of the various intellectual functions described in Book vi. In interpreting the thought of various passages he is in general terse and distinct; so, for instance, in pointing out the primary ethical significance of Aristotle's doctrine of pleasure, or to take a shorter instance, in the note on involuntary actions in Book iii. Naturally no commentator will please everybody. For instance, I do not find the account of commercial justice in Book v., full as it is, stated very clearly. Mr. Stewart regards it as a species of distributive justice, and the connection is unmistakable and is justified by earlier authority (see a note in the April number of the *Classical Review*). But the connection is not so much contained in Aristotle's own statement as an inference of the reader. There is a real difference between a distribution of government grants, or of taxation, and the distribution which is effected by the play of private interests. In another place (vol. i. p. 418) this justice is treated as corrective, in so far as it keeps exchange fair; but where

is corrective justice described as putting things in fair relations? Is it not rather the restoration of fair relations which have been violated? Perhaps a few words might have been introduced to indicate that in all these kinds of particular justice the object (as illustrated by the mathematical analysis) is to leave the parties in the same relative position after the act of justice as they were before.

As to Mr. Stewart's treatment of the main ethical ideas, one turns naturally to the notes on Eudæmonia, on the Will, on the Mean, as Theoria, and the like, in which he endeavors to bring out the full philosophical significance of these conceptions. In doing so he is bearing in the mind the needs of those who, like most students of philosophy at Oxford, practically use the *Ethics* as a text-book of moral philosophy. Hence, as I suppose, arises what will strike most persons as a defect, or at least an element of danger, the habit of reading freely into Aristotle ideas, mainly biological ideas, of contemporary philosophy. From the educational point of view this is extremely instructive and fruitful, but it may lead to misconceptions as to Aristotle's historical position. What must be said in defence is that if you are to try and bring home Aristotle's ethics to the mind as a solution of our own problems, then it is these biological ideas which best express to us his way of thinking. Still, these ideas are such as can be thought out of Aristotle, rather than actually stated in his doctrine. In fact, that doctrine resembles the evolutionist doctrine so much, because Aristotle is philosophizing a merely customary system of morals, in which moral observances fit into their places like the parts of an organism. It should at least be pointed out how far Aristotle falls short of the meaning we attach to these ideas; by omitting to do so Mr. Stewart sometimes makes Aristotle's doctrine less simple than it really is. So the idea of the mean leads on inevitably to that of proportion between an act and the social environment of a person, but what it says is that an act gratifies a passion in a mean extent between excess and defect, approved by custom and determined by reason. Again, in dealing with the will and responsibility, Mr. Stewart seems to give Aristotle credit for too much. Thus on p. 228, vol. i., he writes, "Biologically considered, bodily functions differ from moral *πράξεις* in depending upon structural adaptations of older standing." This is admirably said. But is it Aristotelian? Again, Mr. Stewart's remarks on responsibility seem to me excellent in themselves, but the difficulties discussed by Aristotle

in Book iii. ch. v. suggest that he was really insensible to considerations which some of his contemporaries realized, much in the same way as he shirked the objections raised in his time to slavery. The wisest man of his age may sometimes be less wise than quite inferior men. However, these remarks are intended only by way of qualifying some of Mr. Stewart's expressions; and it is mainly in the earlier portion of the notes that this questionable language will trouble the reader. The defect is not to be weighed against the merits of a book which achieves the difficult object of being interesting as well as massive.

Simultaneously with Mr. Stewart's new commentary on the *Ethics* appears a new translation by Mr. Welldon, who has already translated the *Politics* and the *Rhetoric*, and may, it is to be hoped, go on to some of the less popular works. There are already two good translations of the *Ethics*, the older one of Williams and the later excellent translation of Mr. Peters. Mr. Welldon's translation has great merits. It appears to be accurate, and it certainly makes Aristotle very readable. In this last respect it is probably superior to the older versions.

S. ALEXANDER.

EVOLUTION AND ETHICS. The Romanes Lecture for 1893. By Thomas H. Huxley, F.R.S. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. 57.

Professor Huxley's Romanes Lecture will no doubt be read by every one interested in ethical subjects, and it is consequently needless to give any account of its contents. Its interest lies chiefly in the fact that, though written by one of the most enthusiastic of our biological evolutionists, it entirely repudiates the idea that ethics can be founded on a mere study of the evolutionary process of animal life. "The propounders," he says, "of what are called the 'ethics of evolution,' when the 'evolution of ethics' would usually better express the object of their speculation, adduce a number of more or less interesting facts, and more or less sound arguments in favor of the origin of the moral sentiments, in the same way as other natural phenomena, by a process of evolution. I have little doubt, for my own part, that they are on the right track; but as the immoral sentiments have no less been evolved, there is, so far, as much natural sanction for the one as the other. The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good